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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tara Jean Crist appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance, contending the district court abused its discretion in denying her 
pre-sentencing motion to withdraw her guilty plea. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
On January 23, 2010, a law enforcement officer initiated a traffic stop on a 
vehicle that Crist was a passenger in. (R., p.25; PSI, p.2.) The vehicle pulled over to 
the side of the road and Crist quickly exited the vehicle, appearing distraught and 
looking around. (R., p.25; PSI, p.2.) The officer instructed Crist to get back into the 
vehicle and Crist complied. (R., p.25.) Crist seemed "very jittery" and her eyes were 
"extremely bloodshot and glossy." (R., p.26; PSI, p.2.) When the officer inquired about 
drugs, the driver of the vehicle stated there was a pipe somewhere in the vehicle. (R., 
p.26; PSI, p.2.) The officer located a glass pipe with white residue and burn marks in 
the vehicle. (R., p.26; PSI, p.2.) Upon searching the ground on the passenger side of 
the vehicle, another officer found a brown pouch that contained a blue pipe and two 
baggies with a crystal like substance. (R., p.26; PSI, p.2.) The driver of the vehicle later 
stated that Crist said '"she had gotten rid of hers"' as the vehicle was being pulled over. 
(R., p.27; PSI, p.2.) 
Crist was charged with possession of a controlled substance and possession of 
drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.47-48.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Crist entered an 
Alford plea to the possession of a controlled substance charge and the state agreed to 
dismiss the remaining charge. (R., pp.126-29; 4/13/10 Tr., p.4, L.17 - p.5, L.7; p.35, 
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Ls.17-19.) The state also agreed to recommend drug court. (R., p.126; 4/13/10 Tr., p.5, 
Ls.5-6.) At the change of plea hearing, Crist acknowledged that she understood she 
was not required to plead guilty and that she could proceed to trial if she wanted to. 
(4/13/10 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-12.) The district court told Crist, "It's important for me to know 
that you're not being forced into pleading guilty, so if you wish to go forward what we'll 
do is I'll have you stand and be sworn by the clerk, and then I'll be asking you a long 
series of questions." (4/13/10, Tr., p.5, Ls.13-18.) The district court began by inquiring 
about Grist's age, education, and mental state. (4/13/10 Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.9, L.9.) Crist 
stated she was "stressed out" because she was in the process of moving and she was 
"depressed a little." (4/13/10 Tr., p.9, Ls.10-14; p.10, Ls.16-17.) The district court asked 
Crist if she felt like she could participate in the hearing and Crist stated, ''I'm okay. I'm 
just emotional." (4/13/10 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.4.) The district court asked Crist if she 
would like to take a recess or continue the hearing to a later date and Crist requested a 
recess. (4/13/10 Tr., p.11, L.22- p.12, L.12.) 
After the recess, the district court asked Crist if she was ready to proceed and if 
she had "any unresolved questions at this point." (4/13/10 Tr., p.13, Ls.1-2, 22-23.) 
Crist indicated that she was ready to proceed and that she did not have any other 
questions. (4/13/10 Tr., p.13, Ls.3, 24.) The district court began reviewing the guilty 
plea advisory form Crist completed and the district court described what an Alford plea 
is. (4/13/10 Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, L.24.) Crist stated she understood what an Alford 
plea was, but she did not "understand how in a court of law that that can actually be 
okay, you know, plead guilty but .... " (4/13/10 Tr., p.15, Ls.4-6.) The district court 
explained the purpose of an Alford plea and asked Crist if she was pleading guilty 
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because she did not "want to take the risk of losing the State's offer by going to trial." 
(4/13/10 Tr., p.15, Ls.15-20.) Crist responded "yes" and she acknowledged that the 
state's offer of drug court would be "advantageous" to her. (4/13/10 Tr., p.15, L.21 -
p.16, L.2.) 
The district court noted that Crist seemed to be struggling "emotionally" and 
reiterated to Crist "you're never required to plead guilty. You're never required to enter 
an Alford plea. If you want to have a trial, that's what we do, and I'm happy to set this 
for trial." (4/13/10 Tr., p.16, L.19 - p.17, L.4.) Crist responded by stating "I'm actually 
okay.... The Alford plea just kind of confuses me a little bit." (4/13/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.10-
13.) Crist also stated "I'm actually just kind of like so wishy-washy right now that it's 
like, like I said, a little bit of everything." (4/13/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.16-18.) The district court 
granted another recess so that Crist could "review some more matters with [her 
attorney], go have lunch and think about things and try to find a time this afternoon to 
resume, if you wish, that would be fine." (4/13/10 Tr., p.23, Ls.16-20.) 
After the recess, Grist's attorney stated he reviewed the case with Crist and Crist 
told the court "clerk to call off the jury and that that would not be necessary and that we 
would go forward." (4/13/10 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-6.) Grist's attorney also stated that he 
allowed Crist to have some time to herself during the recess because he "wanted her to 
make this decision on her own .... " (4/13/10 Tr., p.25, Ls.6-12.) Crist indicated that her 
attorney's statements were accurate and Crist told the district court she wanted to go 
forward and plead guilty. (4/13/10 Tr., p.25, Ls.17-21.) 
The district court then told Crist that "an Alford plea is a valid plea, and what I 
need you to know is that, nonetheless, it's still treated as a conviction." (4/13/10 Tr., 
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p.26, Ls.6-9.) The district court informed Crist of the maximum penalty for possession 
of a controlled substance. (4/13/10 Tr., p.26, Ls.19-23.) The district court explained the 
procedure for getting accepted into drug court, but noted that there was "no guarantee" 
Crist would be accepted. (4/13/10 Tr., p.27, L.7 - p.28, L.12.) The district court asked 
Crist if she would still like to plead guilty and Crist responded, "Yes, sir." (4/13/10 Tr., 
p.28, L.17-19.) 
The district court continued with the plea colloquy and Crist stated that she 
understood all of her rights. (4/13/10 Tr., p.28, L.20 - p.30, L.2.) The district court asked 
Crist if she had been threatened, forced or intimidated into pleading guilty against her 
will and she responded, "No, sir." (4/13/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.3-6.) The district court asked 
Crist if she was satisfied with her attorney's representation of her in the case and she 
responded, "Yes, sir." (4/13/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.7-10.) The district court then asked: 
At this point then do you understand that once you plead guilty you are 
admitting, even though it's an Alford plea, that you're guilty of this crime, 
and that once I accept a plea of guilty, there's no right or guarantee that 
you can withdraw that plea of guilty later if you change your mind? Do you 
understand that? 
(4/13/10 Tr., p.30, L.25 p.31, L.6.) Crist responded, "Yes, sir." (4/13/10 Tr., p.31, L.7.) 
After the state provided a factual proffer (4/13/10 Tr., p.31, L.11 - p.34, L.19), 
Crist entered an Alford plea to possession of a controlled substance (4/13/10 Tr., p.35, 
Ls.17-19). The district court asked Crist again, "at the risk of being repetitious and 
tedious, I just want to be sure. Do you want to have a trial?" (4/13/10 Tr., p.36, Ls.7-9.) 
Crist replied, "No, sir." (4/13/10 Tr., p.36, L.10.) The district court accepted Grist's guilty 
plea and stated, "I'm satisfied that you have made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary 
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decision to enter that plea, and I'll make that finding of record at this time." (4/13/10 Tr., 
p.36, Ls.11-16.) 
Crist was scheduled to attend drug court two days after she entered her Alford 
plea. (R., p.122.) However, she was not accepted into drug court because "[s]he was 
supposed to check in and for some reason she was either late for that appointment or 
never showed up properly according to the appointment." (7/12/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-5; 
8/16/10 Tr., p.17, L.17- p.18, L.22; R., p.147.) The matter was set for sentencing and a 
PSI was prepared. (7/12/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.4-6; PSI, pp.1-13.) Crist was not initially present 
at the sentencing hearing, but her attorney informed the district court that Crist was on 
her way. (7/12/10 Tr., p.4, Ls.6-13.) Grist's attorney also informed the court that Crist 
had not reviewed the PSI and "she indicated she wanted to change her plea to not 
guilty." (7/12/10 Tr., p.4, L.18 - p.5, L.2.) Crist arrived at the sentencing hearing and the 
district court held a recess so that Crist could meet with her attorney. (7 /12/10 Tr., p.5, 
L.19 - p.6, L.13.) After the recess, Grist's attorney stated that Crist "would still like to go 
to drug court." (7/12/10 Tr., p.6, Ls.24-25.) However, drug court was no longer an 
option because drug court was not accepting new participants and Crist had already 
been discharged from drug court. (7/12/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.13-23; R., p.143.) Grist's 
attorney then told the district court that Crist would be seeking a different attorney or a 
public defender based on her "dissatisfaction" with him 1 and that Crist might "possibly 
seek a withdrawal of the guilty plea." (7/12/10 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-19.) The district court 
continued the sentencing hearing and stated that it would consider those motions after 
they were filed. (7/12/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9.) 
1 Grist's attorney was later allowed to withdraw as counsel and Crist was appointed a 
public defender. (7/19/10Tr., p.20, L.25-p.21, L.18.) 
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At the continued sentencing hearing, Grist's attorney told the district court that he 
met with Crist to review the PSI and he stated, "I let her have (the PSI] for approximately 
two or three hours even after we met so she could thoroughly go over it, and at this 
point I believe she's ready, willing and able to go forward with sentencing." (7/19/10 Tr., 
p.12, Ls.11-16.) The district court asked Crist if she was ready to proceed to 
sentencing, but Crist stated, "I would like to be able to withdraw my plea and take it to 
trial because I don't feel that-you know, I was at the wrong place at the wrong time, 
you know. And my rap sheet is so ugly that it looks terrible when you look at this .... " 
(7 /19/10 Tr., p.12, L.20 - p.13, L.1.). The district court set a hearing for Grist's motion to 
withdraw her guilty plea and Crist filed the motion approximately three weeks later. 
(7 /19/10 Tr., p.22, Ls.6-8; R., p.169.) 
At the hearing on Grist's motion, Grist's new attorney argued that Crist should be 
allowed to withdraw her guilty plea based on her "mental state" when she pied guilty 
and the "pressure that she was feeling" from her prior attorney to plead guilty. (8/16/10 
Tr., p.39, Ls.15-24.) The district court denied the motion, finding that Crist failed to 
meet her burden of proving a just reason to withdraw her guilty plea. (8/16/10 Tr., p.57, 
Ls.6-22.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years with three years 
fixed and retained jurisdiction.2 (R., pp.190-92; 198; 9/13/10 Tr., p.55, L.19 - p.56, L.14.) 
Crist timely appealed. (R., pp.202-04.) 
2 The district court later relinquished jurisdiction and sua sponte reduced Grist's unified 




Crist states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Grist's motion 
to withdraw her Alford Plea? 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Crist failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion in denying 
her pre-sentencing motion to withdraw her Alford plea? 
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ARGUMENT 
Crist Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Denying 
Her Pre-Sentencing Motion To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
Crist contends the district court abused its discretion in denying her pre-
sentencing motion to withdraw her guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-10.) Specifically, 
Crist asserts that she established "just cause" to withdraw her plea "due to her mental 
state and the fact that her attorney had pressured her into entering her plea." 
(Appellant's brief, p.10.) However, the record supports the district court's determination 
that Crist failed to demonstrate a just reason for withdrawing her guilty plea. As such, 
Crist has failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to 
whether the district court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from 
arbitrary action." State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530, 535-36, 211 P.3d 775, 780-81 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (citing State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 361, 941 P.2d 330, 333 (Ct. App. 
1997)). An appellate court will defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are 
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159,161, 15 P.3d 1167, 
1169 (2000); Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254,256,869 P.2d 571,573 (Ct. App. 1994). 
C. Crist Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Discretion In The Denial Of Her Motion 
To Withdraw Her Guilty Plea 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is governed by I.C.R. 33(c), which provides 
that "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before sentence is 
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imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the 
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant 
to withdraw defendant's plea." Although a district court's discretion should be "liberally 
exercised" when ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made prior to the 
pronouncement of sentence, withdrawal of a guilty plea is not an automatic right. 
Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780; State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 298, 
787 P.2d 281, 284 (1990). Rather, "the defendant has the burden of showing a 'just 
reason' exists to withdraw the plea." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 535, 211 P.3d at 780 
(citations omitted). Failure to present and support a just or plausible reason, even 
absent prejudice to the prosecution, will weigh against granting withdrawal. State v. 
Mayer, 139 Idaho 643, 647, 84 P.3d 579, 583 (Ct. App. 2004). "[T]he good faith, 
credibility, and weight of the defendant's assertions in support of his motion to withdraw 
his plea are matters for the trial court to decide." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d 
at 782. Where, as here, the defendant moves to withdraw her guilty plea before the 
imposition of sentence but after she "has read [the] presentence report or received other 
information about [the] probable sentence, the court is to exercise broad discretion, but 
may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive." State v. 
Johnson, 120 Idaho 408,411,816 P.2d 364,367 (Ct. App. 1991). 
"The first step in analyzing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is to determine 
whether the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made." Hanslovan, 147 
Idaho at 536, 211 P.3d at 781 (citing State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959, 801 P.2d 
1308, 1310 (Ct. App. 1990)). "If the plea is constitutionally valid, the court must then 
determine whether there are any other just reasons for withdrawal of the plea." I.ct.: 
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With respect to the first step of the analysis, on appeal Crist does not directly 
challenge the constitutional validity of her guilty plea or the district court's finding that 
her plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.3 (See Appellant's brief, pp.7-
10.) She claims, however, that she established "just cause" for withdrawing her guilty 
plea. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) The record belies Crist's claim. 
Crist first argues that she established just cause to withdraw her guilty plea 
based on "the emotional turmoil in her life." (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) However, it is 
well established that "anxiety and pressure from the defendant's family situation do not 
constitute impermissible coercion." See Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537-38, 211 P.3d at 
782-83 (citing State v. Spry, 127 Idaho 107,111,897 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Ct. App. 1995); 
State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 928, 894 P.2d 159, 161 (Ct. App. 1995)). This is 
because "external family pressures" are "not attributable to the state." Hanslovan, 147 
Idaho at 538, 211 P.3d at 783. Furthermore, a defendant's emotional state at the time 
of entry of a guilty plea does not necessarily affect the validity of the plea so long as the 
defendant fully understood the charges, understood the possible sentences, reviewed 
the plea agreement before signing it, discussed the agreement with an attorney, and the 
court complied with statutory requirements before accepting the guilty plea. See State v . 
.QQQ.Q, 124 Idaho 481, 483-85, 861 P.2d 51, 53-55 (1993) (rejecting a defendant's claim 
that his guilty pleas were invalid due to "the extreme emotional stress suffered prior to 
entry of his guilty pleas."). 
3 The transcript of the change of plea hearing shows the district court engaged in a 
cautious, deliberate, lengthy colloquy to ensure Crist's plea was made knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily. (4/13/10 Tr., p.5, L.13- p.31, L.10; p.34, L21 -p.36, L.16.) 
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At the change of plea hearing, Crist testified that she was "stressed out" because 
"the home that we live in, it got sold, so we're having to move, and we haven't found a 
place. We have 15 days to move out, but that doesn't have anything to do with this." 
(4/13/10 Tr., p.9, Ls.10-14.) The district court inquired further, stating "I always ask if 
anything's happening in a person's personal life outside of court that's traumatic or 
deeply upsetting, and it sounds like something has occurred for you; is that correct?" 
(4/13/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.1-5.) Crist replied: 
Just stress. I mean, I'm totally stressed out on everything, having 
to move and just the spur of the moment. I have a two-and-a-half-year 
old, as you know, and it was kind of a-you know, my kids are 17 and 19, 
and then I had a little one that's kind of-I think maybe I have-what do 
they call it after you have a baby? I'm on some medicine for that, but 
we've tried different ones, and I'm just depressed a little. 
(4/13/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.8-17.) 
The district court asked Crist if she felt like any of those things were "preventing 
[her] from being able to participate" in the hearing and Crist stated, "No I'm okay. I'm 
just emotional." (4/13/10 Tr., p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.4.) Crist went on to explain: 
it's just like-I would like to be able to come in here and not be like this, 
you know, and talk to you and be more at ease about everything because, 
you know, the moving situation is unreal. We haven't found nowhere to 
go. It was a spur of the moment thing and then this postpartum or 
whatever, and my husband and I haven't been getting along because of all 
the stress and then this. 
(4/13/1 O Tr., p.11, Ls.13-21.) 
At the withdrawal of guilty plea hearing, Crist stated she was "emotionally 
unstable" on the day she entered her guilty plea because she had been arguing 
with her husband about "[e]verything that you can think of, friends, family, kids." 
(8/16/10 Tr., p.8, Ls.8-19.) The district court found: 
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She was fully aware of knowing the consequences of the case. She knew 
she had a prior. She knew what was at stake and knew those issues, and 
when she testified about trying to make the decision whether to plead 
guilty today, she testified about the things any rational defendant would 
look at and that is she testified that she was trying to look at what could be 
worse; namely, taking the agreement or going to trial, could miss out on 
her kids' life and knew it was stressful. That's inherent in the criminal 
system. It's inherent that it's a difficult decision to decide to plead guilty to 
a felony when there may be defenses to it, there could be issues, and it is 
rational and the exact purpose of an Alford plea for a defendant to 
consider the benefits of taking the agreement versus the risks of going to 
trial. 
(8/16/10 Tr., p.50, L. 18 - p.51, L. 19.) The district court went on to find: 
So she made a difficult decision, and it's clear throughout the whole 
transcript that she was emotional, wasn't sure at certain points and had 
every opportunity to tell the Court, no, I need to go to trial, can't plead 
guilty to this, got to go forward .... 
She discussed on cross examination today-well, specifically on 
the same issue that she was weighing her options. She had the drug 
court recommendation which was better than a recommendation for 
penitentiary time, knew that going to the penitentiary was possible and 
wanted to avoid the risk of doubling the sentence. 
(8/16/10 Tr., p.51, L.14 - p.52, L.8.) 
Although Crist may have appeared to be emotional at the change of plea hearing 
due to the anxiety and pressure she felt from her family situation ( 4/13/10 Tr., p.12, 
Ls.1-4), none of that anxiety constituted a just reason to withdraw her guilty plea 
because her external family pressures were not attributable to the state. The record 
demonstrates that Crist fully understood the charges against her, understood the 
possible sentences she was facing, reviewed plea bargain agreement before signing it, 
discussed the agreement with her attorney, and the court complied with. statutory 
requirements before accepting the guilty plea. (See generally R., pp.124-37; 4/13/10 Tr., 
p.5, L.13 - p.31, L.10; p.34, L.21 - p.36, L.16.) Furthermore, the district court gave Crist 
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multiple opportunities to continue the change of plea no~:a.-,,,,,... to a later date if she felt 
like her emotional state was interfering with her to plead guilty. (4/13/10 Tr., 
p.10, L.23 - p.11, L.12; p.11, Ls.22-24; p.21, Ls.16-21; p.36, Ls.7-9.) Therefore, Crist 
has failed to establish error in the district court's conclusion that her mental state was 
not a just reason to withdraw her guilty plea. 
Crist has not challenged the constitutional validity of her guilty plea or the district 
court's finding that her plea was voluntarily made. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 7 -10.) 
Despite this, she argues that she established a just reason to withdraw her guilty plea 
based on her claim that her attorney "pressured" her into pleading guilty by leading "her 
to believe she was interfering with his time and wanted her to plead guilty." (Appellant's 
brief, pp.9-10.) This argument should be rejected because Crist has cited no legal 
authority for the proposition that even if an attorney's recommendation to plead guilty 
did not render the guilty plea involuntary in a constitutional sense, it can still provide a 
just reason for withdrawing the plea. 
Furthermore, the record shows that Crist fully understood the terms of the plea 
agreement and she was not coerced or impermissibly pressured by anyone to enter a 
guilty plea. R., pp.132, 135-36; 4/13/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.3-6; 8/16/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.1-
10.) Crist specifically acknowledged that she could not be forced by anyone, "including 
[her] attorney," to plead guilty. (R., p.135.) While defense counsel undoubtedly 
recommended Crist plead guilty so that she could have the opportunity to participate in 
drug court and avoid the sentencing enhancement that could have doubled the 
sentence she was facing (see 8/16/10 Tr., p11, Ls.15-21; p.15, L.25 - p.17, L.7), such 
advice does not constitute coercion or just cause for withdrawing a guilty plea. 
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Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 538, 211 P.3d at 783 ("[C]ounsel's advice that Hanslovan 
accept the state's plea agreement was not such overbearing force as to constitute 
coercion.") (citing Davidson v. State, 92 Idaho 104, 106, 437 P.2d 620, 622 (1968)); 
State v. Dye, 124 Idaho 250, 858 P.2d 789 (Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he fact that counsel 
advised Dye to enter the guilty pleas and Dye relied upon that advice is not evidence of 
coercion."). Rather, such advice is precisely what is expected of counsel in a criminal 
case. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1970); Dunlap v. State, 141 
Idaho 50, 60-61, 106 P.3d 376, 386-87 (2004) (finding the "trial judge did reasonably 
determine that the defendant was adequately advised by trial counsel on the proposed 
plea agreement."); Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 538, 211 P.3d at 783. Grist's 
unsubstantiated clam that her attorney impermissibly "pressured" her into pleading 
guilty by leading "her to believe she was interfering with his time" (Appellant's brief, 
pp.9-10) did not constitute just cause to withdraw her guilty plea. The district court 
correctly concluded as much, and Crist has failed to show the court erred. 
The real motivation behind Grist's motion to withdraw her guilty plea was the fact 
that she was not accepted into drug court because she was either late or failed to show 
up for her initial appointment. (See 7/12/10 Tr., p.7, Ls.1-5; 8/16/10 Tr., p.53, L 12 -
p.54, L.2; R., p.147.) When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty plea before the 
imposition of sentence but after she "has read [the] presentence report or received other 
information about [the] probable sentence, the court is to exercise broad discretion, but 
may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive." Johnson, 120 
Idaho at 411, 816 P.2d at 367 (emphasis added; citation omitted). 
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The district court correctly found that Grist's knowledge that she would not be 
accepted into drug court is analogous to a situation in which the defendant has 
reviewed the PSI prior to moving for withdrawal of a guilty plea. (8/16/10 Tr., p.52, L.9 -
p.54, L.6.) The district court appropriately considered Grist's apparent motive in 
attempting to withdraw her guilty plea and found that: 
an accused is not encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of potential 
punishment and withdraw the plea if the punishment is unexpectedly 
severe. And given the posture of the case with drug court would be-
problem solving courts being a little different twist on this issue, the 
defendant essentially got to do that. She got to take advantage of the 
favorable plea offer, somebody with a prior felony record, maybe one of 
the exact types of people who should get that opportunity, a high risk 
defendant, essentially someone who's got a lot to gain from drug court 
and can stand to lose and got to try that on for size, and when it didn't 
work out we show up in court and now, well, there's a question about the 
motion to withdraw the plea. 
(8/16/10 Tr., p.53, L.12 - p.54, L.2.) The district court also found that Crist "obviously 
had a reason to know that the sentence could be maybe a more immediate 
consequence-more severe consequence than drug court." (8/16/10 Tr., p.54, Ls.4-6.) 
Crist contends that "there is no evidence" the reason she moved to withdraw her 
guilty plea was based on her knowledge that she was not accepted into drug court 
because she "specifically asserted, and testified, that she was moving to withdraw her 
guilty plea on the basis that she was not guilty of the instant crime and that she felt 
pressured to enter a plea at the change of plea hearing." (Appellant's brief, p.9.) 
However, as stated above, "the good faith, credibility, and weight of the defendant's 
assertions in support of his motion to withdraw his plea are matters for the trial court to 
decide." Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 537, 211 P.3d at 782 (citations omitted). 
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The district court was not required to take Grist's testimony regarding her motives 
in moving to withdraw her guilty plea at face value. The district court weighed the 
credibility of Grist's testimony in light of the surrounding facts and found that Crist 
wanted to withdraw her guilty plea because she was not accepted into drug court and 
she was facing a harsher penalty than she originally thought she would under the terms 
of the plea agreement.4 The district court compared Grist's testimony at the change of 
plea hearing to Grist's testimony at the hearing on her motion to withdraw her plea and 
appropriately found that "it's not a just reason to simply allow a defendant to withdraw a 
plea based on new statements that directly contradict prior ones." (8/16/10 Tr., p.57, 
Ls.6-8.) 
Finally, Crist argues that the district court should have allowed her to withdraw 
her guilty plea because the state made no showing that it would be prejudiced by the 
withdrawal. (Appellant's brief, p.10.) There are two reasons why this argument fails. 
First, it was Grist's burden to establish a just reason for withdrawing her guilty plea, not 
the state's burden to establish that it would suffer any prejudice as a result of the 
withdrawal. E.&_, State v. Wyatt, 131 Idaho 95, 97, 952 P.2d 910, 912 (Ct. App. 1998). 
Second, the district court specifically found that "at this point there is something to 
consider in terms of prejudice to the state" because the state was "ready to go" to trial at 
the time of the change of plea hearing, but a witness for the state was currently wanted 
on a warrant and therefore unavailable. (8/16/10 Tr., p.55, Ls.13-23.) 
4 Crist also reviewed the PSI prior to moving to withdraw her guilty plea (7/19/10 Tr., 
p.12, Ls.11-16), which is a factor that can be considered in determining a defendant's 
apparent motive. See Johnson, 120 Idaho at 411, 816 P .2d at 367. 
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Crist failed to present a just reason for withdrawal of her guilty plea. The district 
court applied the correct legal standards and acted within the bounds of its discretion in 
denying Grist's motion. Based upon the sworn statements Crist made when entering 
her guilty plea and her failure to present any evidence that her plea was involuntary or 
that there was just reason to withdraw her guilty plea, the district court correctly denied 
Grist's motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Grist's judgment of conviction 
for possession of a controlled substance. 
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2012. 
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